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Abstract 
This paper describes how differences in health status at retirement can influence the 
decision to purchase a life annuity. We extend previous research on annuitization 
decisions by incorporating the effect of health differentials via differences in survival 
throughout the latter portion of life. Next, we consider how precautionary savings 
motivated by uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenses influence annuitization decisions. 
Our results show that annuities become less attractive to people facing uncertain medical 
expenses. While full annuitization would still be optimal if annuity markets were truly 
complete and both life- and health-contingent, lacking this, annuity equivalent wealth 
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The Impact of Health Status and Out-of-Pocket  
Medical Expenditures on Annuity Valuation 
 
Cassio M. Turra and Olivia S. Mitchell 
  
The primary purpose of annuities is to protect people against the risk of outliving their 
own financial resources in old age. Prior research has shown that annuities should be of 
substantial value to risk-averse people who face an uncertain date of death (Yaari 1965), yet 
relatively few people seem to purchase annuities at the point of retirement (Johnson, Burman, 
and Kobes 2004). A growing body of research has focused on the factors that may explain this 
puzzle, factors that include a desire to leave bequests, the existence of adverse selection in the 
annuity market, the over-annuitization of retirement wealth, and the need for liquidity. Further, 
researchers have found that people use private information about their survival chances to make 
the decision of purchasing an annuity, and those who anticipate living longer are more likely to 
buy an annuity (Petrova 2003).Yet currently we have a poor understanding of how private 
information on health status is related to the demand for annuities. Investigations of this kind are 
challenging for a number of reasons, including the multi-dimensional aspect of health, and the 
absence of long-term nationally representative panel data on health at older ages.  
The objective of this paper is to address this gap in knowledge by describing how 
differences in health status at retirement can influence the decision to purchase a life annuity. To 
do this, we use dynamic discrete choice estimation which is based on standard models of 
economic behavior. We propose two models which incorporate the effect of health differentials 
on annuitization valuation. One approach incorporates the effect of health via differences in 
survival throughout the life-cycle. However this approach does not consider precautionary 
savings motivated by uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenses, so in an extension, retirees in   2
different health states are posited to consider both the effects of uncertain out-of-pocket medical 
expenses and uncertain survival, when making choices about annuitization. We compare the 
optimal level of annuitization and the insurance value of a life annuity for people in different 
health states at the point of annuity purchase.    
As compared to previous studies, this paper is distinguished by its effort to measure the 
impact of anticipated poor health on annuity valuation. This is important in the retirement 
context since there is substantial risk of becoming disabled after age 65:  at age 70, for instance, 
people must anticipate that they will have severe functional limitations for about one-quarter of 
their remaining lifetimes. Further, 70 percent of their remaining years will be spent with at least 
some functional difficulty (Crimmins, Hayward, and Saito 1994). In addition, greater disability 
implies much higher spending for the elderly: people with severe functioning limitations have 
annual Medicare costs $7,000 higher than nondisabled persons (Cutler and Meara 2001). 
Therefore our study is informative regarding the potential for development of an impaired 
annuity market that offers higher payouts for consumers in poor health.  
Understanding how health status affects annuity markets is also important for policy 
analysts, in particular those who propose personal Social Security retirement accounts (Cogan 
and Mitchell 2003). Recent research has suggested that mandating annuitization for all 
participants in a personal accounts scheme would imply transfers from high-mortality risk groups 
to low-mortality risk groups (c.f. Brown 2003). Health and mortality are also strongly associated, 
particularly among the elderly (Hurd, McFadden, and Merrill 2001). Consequently, 
understanding how health influences the insurance value of annuities may help insurers fashion 
annuity offerings under Social Security reform plans, so as to make a larger proportion of the 
participants better off.    3
Background 
Over the last three decades, defined contribution (DC) pension plans have experienced 
substantial growth in the US, with almost 60 percent of covered workers now having these plans 
(Mitchell, Gordon, and Twinney 1997;  U.S. DOL 2001).  As more employees reach retirement 
with large DC pension accruals, they are increasingly allowed to receive their savings as a lump 
sum, rather than annuitizing the saving as under conventional defined benefit (DB) plans.  The 
concern is that by taking their accumulated DC assets in a lump sum, participants face the risk of 
exhausting their pension assets before dying (Mitchell et al. 1997).  
One way to protect against longevity risk is to purchase a life annuity. Economic models 
predict that risk-averse individuals with no bequest motives would strongly favor converting all 
their DC pension assets to private annuities; for example, Mitchell et al. (1999) show that age-65 
retirees with access to an actuarially fair annuity market would be predicted to fully annuitize at 
age 65.  Further, that study estimated that people lacking access to an annuity market would be 
willing to forgo between 30 and 40 percent of their wealth at age 65, in order to purchase 
actuarially fair annuities. Later, Brown (2003) used the same approach to show how cross-group 
mortality differentials can influence life annuity insurance values.  He found that annuities 
provide considerable longevity insurance to all groups, regardless of their race, ethnic group, or 
educational attainment, and even when annuity premiums are actuarially unfair, those facing 
high mortality (e.g. blacks with low education) would still value a life annuity.  
These studies confirm the pioneering theoretical work of Yaari (1965) who showed that 
people with no bequest motives who face uncertain date of death would choose to fully   4
annuitize.
1 This approach, therefore, predicts that that there should be substantial growth in the 
US demand for life annuities, as more workers retire with large investments in DC plans. Yet this 
has not been the case to date. Thus Johnson et al. (2004) used 10 years of data from the Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS)
 2 to evaluate how persons age 55+ disposed of their DC and 
Individual Retirement Account (IRA) funds. They reported that only four percent of workers 
with DC plans annuitized their assets when they retired, and only 13 percent of those who took 
their accumulations from IRAs converted the resources to private annuities. Further, the market 
for individual life annuity in the U.S. remains small, amounting to less than 10 percent of the size 
of the life insurance market (in 1999, Brown et al. 2001). 
Several hypotheses have been offered to explain the low demand for private annuities, 
though considerable uncertainty about this puzzle remains. Some attribute the problem to 
adverse selection in annuity markets: for instance, only people with very low mortality might 
tend to purchase annuities, increasing the premium cost for people with average mortality 
prospects (e.g. Mitchell and McCarthy 2002).  Nevertheless, although adverse selection does 
generate low rates of return in annuity contracts for persons of average mortality, annuity pricing 
seems to have little empirical impact on how consumers value life annuities (Brown 2003). 
Another explanation offered is that the elderly are over-annuitized in the form of Social Security, 
and thus they may not need to purchase additional annuitization to insure against longevity risk. 
                                                 
1 Recently, Davidoff, Brown and Diamond (2003) have extended Yaari’s model and derived the 
conditions for full annuitization to be optimal under a more general setting than that of the original model. 
Those authors show that when markets are complete, full annuitization is optimal even if some 
assumptions of Yaari’s model are relaxed, such as additively separable utility. That paper further shows 
that the value of annuities lessens when annuity markets are incomplete, but some annuitization is still 
optimal as long as there is a positive premium for annuitizing wealth and conventional markets are 
complete.   
2 The Health and Retirement Study is a nationally representative study of the non-institutionalized 
population aged 51 and older and their spouses/partners (regardless of age). The HRS data contain 
detailed data on health, financial status, retirement and family support. Cohorts were interviewed in 
different waves from 1992 to 2002 (http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/).   5
Empirical studies, however, tend to suggest that the elderly would be better off by purchasing 
additional private annuity contracts (Brown 2001a; Brown and Warshawsky 2001). Recently, 
Petrova (2003) used the HRS to evaluate whether perceived mortality influences the desire to 
purchase a life annuity and confirmed that private information on longevity has a strong 
influence on the decision to purchase a life annuity. 
Information on health status is a key component of private information on longevity, and 
therefore it is a determinant of subjective survival probabilities (Hurd et al. 2001). Yet little is 
known about the relation between health status and the decision to purchase a life annuity. 
Earlier studies have investigated how uncertain health and therefore, uncertain medical expenses, 
affect consumption and saving decisions at older ages (e.g. Davis 1998; Hubbard, Skinner, and 
Zeldes 1995; Palumbo 1999). Our approach provides new evidence of the effect of health status 
on annuity decision-making, and it shows that the economic model which ignores health tends to 
overestimate both the level of desired annuitization and the insurance value of a life annuity. Our 
results suggest that retirees who face uncertain health would prefer to partially annuitize and 
maintain some assets in liquid form, so they can buffer the negative effect of unexpected out-of-
pocket medical expenses on future consumption.  
Valuing Life Annuities 
In this section, we first discuss a general multiperiod model of annuity purchase with 
uncertain survival, and we then extend the approach to incorporate uncertain out-of-pocket 
medical expenses a well as uncertain survival. Next, we discuss parameterization of the models 
as well as data sources used to evaluate key outcomes.   6
Model 1: A Yaari-Type Model 
Our first approach extends the multiperiod model of Yaari’s (1965) classical life-cycle approach 
with uncertain lifetimes, as developed by Brown (2003; 2001b) and Mitchell et al. (1999). We 
posit that, at retirement – say, age 65 – the individual decides how much of his starting wealth 
should be annuitized. This is a maximization problem: that is, given current and future conditions 
(e.g. interest rate and mortality distributions), the consumer maximizes the value function by 
selecting the amount of annuity which provides the largest discounted sum of expected future 
utility. The model posits that consumers are rational and understand the consequences of their 
choices for future consumption, even though the exact outcomes are probabilistic. That is, while 
one’s date of death is uncertain, a forward-looking retiree can evaluate his mortality distribution 
based on his health status at the age of annuity purchase.  
The consumer’s problem is solved using backward recursion; first the terminal period 
problem is solved, and then we work backward to find the value function at age 65.  In the 
terminal period, t=95, the future value function is equal to 0 since death is certain by the next 
period (t+1).
 3 Assuming no bequest motive, the retiree would maximize utility while consuming 
all remaining wealth, Wt; the period t single immediate life annuity, At; and pre-existing real 
annuity (e.g. social security benefits) St (Brown 2001b): 
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3 This is the maximum age for which we can estimate reliable parameters based on actual data. Using an 
older age for the terminal age does not affect our conclusions since the probability of surviving beyond 
age 95 is low.     7
where r is the interest rate. Knowing the optimal consumption decision in period t allows one to 
find the optimal consumption decision that maximizes the value function in period t-1. The same 
logic is used subsequently in each previous period to choose the consumption that maximizes the 
Bellman equation: 
   )] ( [ ) ( 1 1 1 1 t t t t t c V p c u V − − − + = β ,        (3) 
where β  is the discount factor, and 1pt-1 is the probability of surviving from period t-1 to t for an 
individual of health status j at the age at annuity purchase. We approximate optimal consumption 
paths by making wealth discrete and testing a large number of values between arbitrary 
minimum and maximum values that are consistent with the initial conditions of the model.     
We seek to learn both the optimal level of annuitization at age 65 and the value of a life 
annuity. Following Mitchell et al.(1999), we perform a counterfactual exercise with two 
scenarios. First, we estimate the value function assuming people have full access to the annuity 
market; in other words, we choose the optimal level of annuitization that maximizes the value 
function, ranging from 0 to full annuitization. Next, we estimate the value function in an 
alternative scenario where people have no access at all to the annuity market, and we ask how 
much additional starting wealth (W0) they would have to receive to make them as well off, as in 
the first scenario with the annuitization option. The insurance value of a life-annuity is computed 
by comparing the two scenarios and computing the Annuity Equivalent Wealth measure (AEW), 
which indicates how much W0 in the second scenario needs to be increased to produce the same 
value function in both scenarios.  
Model 2: Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses 
Uncertainty regarding medical expenses may offer a reason for retirees to maintain 
additional wealth instead of annuitizing all their assets, in which case, a model that ignores out-  8
of-pocket medical expenses may not be fully descriptive of the world. We therefore next turn to 
an alternative version of the multiperiod model in which the retiree considers the effect of both 
uncertain future medical expenses and uncertain survival when choosing his optimal 
consumption path. Specifically, at the age of annuity purchase, we posit that the retiree has 
private information regarding his future health status. He uses this information to evaluate the 
distribution of future health transitions, although his exact future health outcomes remain 
probabilistic. Each period (year) from age 65 to 95 (or death), the individual learns whether he 
will incur out-of-pocket medical expenses. The probability of incurring out-of-pocket medical 
expenses posited to be a function of the retiree’s health status, age, and sex. The model has the 
intuitive implication that people cannot precisely predict their future medical expenses, but they 
know their out-of-pocket medical expenses at each age, and they use this information when 
deciding about optimal future consumption.   
The individual’s problem in each period then has several possible outcomes. The 
expected value function is calculated by considering all possible combinations of health status 
and out-of-pocket medical expenses. The individual is posited to solve for consumption which 
maximizes utility for each possible path. At each period, the value function is the weighted sum 
of all solutions found, where the weights are the probabilities for each possible combination of 
health status and medical expenses:  
] ) , , ( ) , , ( max[ ) , , (
1
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where h t-1 is health status at t-1, Mt-1 is period t-1 out-of-pocket medical expenses, and g t-1 
denotes the probabilities for the k possible combinations of health status and medical expenses. 
Following earlier studies (e.g. Hubbard et al. 1995; Palumbo 1999), we assume that medical 
expenses are not a consumption good and that individuals cannot borrow against the future. 
Therefore, a retiree who incurs out-of-pocket medical expenses is constrained to consume only 
the resources that remain, after paying for medical care in each period. We also rely on the 
simplifying assumption that medical expenses in each period are uncorrelated with health status 
and mortality in the next period.
4 
The solution approach first involves choosing the optimal solution for terminal period 
and then we continue recursively to find the value function at the age 65. In a fashion identical to 
that described above, the optimal consumption path is calculated for all annuitization options, 
and we then choose the one that gives the largest discounted sum of expected future utility. The 
AEW is then computed to estimate the insurance value of a life annuity in the context of 
uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenses. Results for both models are compared. 
Model Parameterization  












c U ,         ( 6 )  
whereγ  is the coefficient of risk aversion (Brown 2001b; Hubbard et al. 1995). Since the third 
derivative of the isoelastic utility function is positive, thus it implicitly allows for precautionary 
savings that will arise out of uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenses in our second model 
                                                 
4 Health status and mortality in period t depend on health status in period t-1, and the probability of 
incurring medical costs is a function of health status in period t-1. For this reason, part of the correlation 
between medical expenses and health status or survival in period t is indirectly accounted for in our 
model. Future work will explore alternative formulations.   10
(Deaton 1992).  Consistent with earlier studies (e.g. Hubbard et al. 1995), we assume a value for 
γ  of three in our main analysis, and we also present sensitivity analyses using alternative values 
for γ  of one and five.
5  Further, we assume a value of three percent for the rate of time 
preference, β , and a real three percent rate of interest per year, consistent with earlier 
applications of the AEW measure (Brown 2001b; Mitchell et al. 1999; Petrova 2003). 
We also must specify the probabilities of dying at each age, conditional on the health 
status at the age of annuity purchase (assumed to be 65). For example, suppose we are solving 
the models for an individual in good health at age 65. We need to know his age-specific 
probabilities of dying at ages 65 to 95, given he was in good health one to 30 years previously. 
The ideal dataset to estimate these would offer as many years of observation as the lifespans 
modeled. Unfortunately, no nationally representative panel data on long-term health and 
mortality have been collected. Consequently, we instead use a multi-state model (Palloni 2001; 
Schoen and Land 1979) to mimic the dependence of mortality on initial health states. This allows 
us to follow a hypothetical cohort from age 65 onward, and to calculate the probabilities of dying 
at each age, assuming persons at age 65 were in a specific state of health j. Each age-specific 
probability of dying is then posited to reflect health status as of the entry age of 65.   
The use of a multistate model requires the estimation of forces of decrement between 
states of health. We use the HRS from 1993 to 2000 to estimate these decrements, since the 
survey reports mortality and health changes every two years stayed in the same state of health for 
up to five years. Using cohort data is an improvement, compared to the cross sectional forms of 
                                                 
5 Previous studies have suggested that risk aversion may vary across population subgroups; thus Halek 
and Eisenhauer (2001) find that risk aversion in the HRS increases with education and is higher among 
natives and non-Hispanics; also self-reported depressed individuals have 13 percent lower risk aversion 
than the average individual. In future research we will evaluate the sensitivity of results to the hypothesis 
that people in poor health have lower risk aversion than those in good health.    11
the multistate model, since we can reasonably approximate some of the effects of duration on the 
forces of transition (Schoen 1988). The duration-specific probabilities are specified as a 
multinomial logit model of the following form: 















j β β β α   ,    (7) 
where pj is probability that an event j (health transition or death) occurs; pJ is the probability that 
a baseline event occurs; and Xi are indicators of individual health status in earlier waves.  
As noted by many, health is a multidimensional concept that can be measured in many 
different ways. In a previous study, we determined the best predictors of old-age mortality 
among several health indicators (Turra 2004). That model determined that functional status, 
smoking, and self-assessed health explain most of the deaths at ages 70+.  Accordingly, for the 
present analysis, we derive results using three states of health based on functional status data: no 
functioning problems, IADL limitations,
6 and ADL limitations.
7  Table 1 summarizes estimates 
calculated from the mortality model described above. We show life expectancy at age 65 for both 
men and women, conditional on health status at age 65. Not surprisingly, age-65 health 
differences have important implications for differences in life expectancy. For example, women 
with no functional limitations can expect to live 6.71 more years at age 65 than can women with 
ADL limitations. Among men, the difference of 5.7 years is smaller but still substantial.  
Table 1 here 
Assuming no loading and no taxes, the expected present value of the payment stream 
from a single immediate life annuity is given by Brown (2001b) as:   
                                                 
6 Instrumental Activities of Daily Living. This state includes difficulties in performing at least one of the 
following activities: managing the money, making phone calls, preparing a hot meal, shopping for 
grocery.  
7 Activities of Daily Living. This state includes difficulties in performing at least one of the following 

































,        ( 8 )  
where qj is the age-specific probability of dying; rk is the real interest rate; and  k π  is the inflation 
rate. As mentioned above, the proportion of starting wealth (W0) in single immediate life 
annuity, α , indicates the optimal level of annuitization and is determined by the model.   
To investigate the effects of adverse selection in the annuity market, we calculate optimal 
annuitization and AEW under two approaches to annuity pricing. A first set of estimates assumes 
that retirees have access to actuarially fairly priced annuities:
8 in this case, we use the mortality 
distributions discussed above to calculate single immediate life annuity payments for someone in 
each health status. A second set of estimates assumes that all purchasers pay uniform prices; in 
this alternative case, we use the same mortality distribution for everyone to calculate the annuity 
payments irrespective of health status. The second scenario uses annuitant life table provided by 
the Society of Actuaries (SOA 1999).  
Table 2 presents estimated expected discounted values of annuity payments per premium 
dollar. These estimates represent the case when everyone pays uniform pricing, as described 
above, and it also indicates how much annuity payouts vary across people in different health 
states. The results show that the value-per-premium dollar is always below one, regardless of sex 
and discount rate. Indeed, in an earlier study (Turra 2004), we found that annuitant mortality is 
slightly lower than mortality of healthy individuals in the population, which explains why the 
results in Table 2 are always below one. The values appear particularly low for men and retirees 
                                                 
8 An actuarially fair premium is one in which the premium equals the present discounted value of 
expected annuity payments.   13
with ADL limitations, between 0.65 and 0.70. These estimates therefore imply that there would 
be significant adverse selection in the private annuity market, so that the decision to purchase a 
life annuity implies payouts well below the actuarially fair value, especially for retirees in poor 
health. 
Table 2 here 
Another central economic parameter is the amount of starting wealth invested in a pre-
existing real annuity; for instance this could include DB pension benefits and Social Security 
payments. The larger is the starting wealth in a pre-existing real annuity, the smaller will be the 
amount remaining that the retiree can use to purchase the life annuity.  For many simulations, we 
assume that half of initial wealth is held in a pre-existing real annuity, a stylized description of 
the Social Security system (Mitchell and Moore 1998; Moore and Mitchell 2000). For sensitivity 
analyses, we also assume that the pre-existing real annuity is either 25 or 75 percent of total 
retirement wealth.  
Our empirical approach handles out-of-pocket medical expenses as a percent of the 
retiree’s pre-existing real annuity (pension or Social Security income), for two reasons. First, 
using relative rather than dollar values for out-of-pocket medical expenses avoids having to 
estimate dollar values for other model parameters, that is, all values are given in relative terms 
(e.g. relative to W0 =100). Second, by making medical expenses a function of retirement income, 
this implicitly assumes that the amount that the elderly spend on health care depends on income 
levels, which is a reasonable way to represent the distribution of health care costs by 
socioeconomic group.  
Estimating out-of-pocket medical expenses requires calculating: 1) the distribution of 
health status at each age; 2) the value of medical expenses (as a proportion of Social Security   14
income); and 3) the probabilities of incurring medical expenses by age and health. To derive the 
distribution of health status by age, we use the multistate life table model discussed above to 
calculate the probability of being in each health state by age, conditional on the health state at the 
age of annuity purchase (assumed to be 65). Figure 1 summarizes the results for men, and the 
graphs show the distribution of health status by age among male survivors, given their functional 
status at age 65. As expected, the distributions of health states are very different at early ages, but 
they become more similar at very old ages, as health deteriorates for all people regardless of their 
initial state of heath.
9  
Figure 1 here 
Next, we calculate the value of out-of-pocket medical expenses as a proportion of Social 
Security income. We use estimates provided by RAND
10 based on data from the Health and 
Retirement Study for the years 1998 and 2000. In the dataset, out-of-pocket medical expenses 
include expenditures not covered by health insurance in services such as hospital stays, nursing 
home stays, doctor visits, prescription drugs, dental care, home health care, outpatient surgery, 
and other services. In addition, we include total costs of premium for health insurance 
coverage.
11 For each respondent aged 65 and older, we calculate the ratio of out-of-pocket 
medical expenses to Social Security income. For purposes of analytical tractability, we then 
create a discrete distribution of the ratios by dividing them into 11 categories of expenses, 
anchored at 0 and ranging to ≥ 300 percent of Social Security income. Table 3 summarizes the 
distribution of observations in each of these categories, in the year 2000. As is clear, most of the 
individuals who incurred out-of-pocket expenses spent less than than 25 percent of their annual 
                                                 
9 In general, results for women are similar, although the proportion of female survivors with functional 
limitations is higher than that of men (results available upon request).  
10 We use the 2004 RAND SSA-HRS datafile (http://www.rand.org/labor/aging/dataprod/#randhrs). 
11 Total premiums includes premiums for employer-provided health insurance, private health insurance, 
long-term care insurance, Medicare through a Health Maintenance Organization, and Medigap.   15
Social Security income. Nevertheless, about 5.5 percent of the elderly above age 65 did devote 
more 100 percent of their Social Security income to out-of-pocket medical expenses.  
Table 3 here 
To calculate the probability of incurring out-pocket-medical expenses in each category, 
we use a multinomial logit model controlling for health status two years earlier, age, and sex.  
Table 4 presents the results from fitting the logit model for five categories of medical expenses.
12 
The estimated coefficients give the partial effects of the explanatory variables on the log-odds of 
being in each category of medical expenses relative to the lowest category (of 0-25 percent of 
Social Security income). A positive coefficient indicates that the explanatory variable increases 
the probability of being in each category relative to the comparison category. It is apparent from 
Table 4 that the probability of incurring medical expenditures is significantly higher for women 
and persons in poor health status. The partial effects further indicate that age is significantly 
associated with the probability of incurring the highest category of medical costs (300+ percent 
of Social Security income). 
Table 4 here 
These probabilities of incurring out-of-pocket medical expenses are combined with the 
distributions of health status by age as described before, to compute the probability of each 
possible consumption path by age and health. Finally, to represent the value of out-of-pocket 
medical expenses and health, we use the median ratio in each category of out-of-pocket medical 
expenses (see Table 3). 
                                                 
12 We present only results for five categories to make results clear; results for the omitted categories are 
consistent with those presented in Table 4.   16
Results 
Consider first the optimal annuitization and the annuity equivalent wealth (AEW) for 
people who face no uncertain medical expenses. For each state of health, they show the optimal 
choices under uniform pricing and actuarially fair risk pricing. We assume a pre-existing real 
annuity worth 50 percent of initial wealth, and three alternative degrees of risk aversion. 
Focusing on a risk aversion level of three, it appears that there are utility gains from purchasing a 
nominal annuity in Table 5, a finding consistent with previous empirical analyses (e.g. Brown 
2003; Mitchell et al. 1999). Full annuitization is the optimal solution even when men and women 
lack access to an actuarially fair contract. Yet there is a much larger dispersion in the AEW 
values across population subgroups, as compared to earlier studies. Our figures vary between 
1.17 and 1.85, and they depend heavily on the interaction between health status and annuity 
pricing. In the case of women with ADL limitations, for example, AEW falls from 1.85  when 
annuities are actuarially fair, to only 1.17 under uniform pricing. In other words, adverse 
selection in annuities appears to impose high opportunity costs for people in poor health, and it 
also reduces considerably the insurance value of a nominal annuity.  
Table 5 here 
The effects of adverse selection are further evident at a risk aversion level of one. In this 
case, the results in Table 5 show that women with ADL limitations and men with IADL or ADL 
limitations will choose partial annuitization. For example, men with ADL limitations will invest 
only half of available wealth in private annuities. Not surprisingly, the insurance value of 
annuities also falls considerably: AEW is 1.02 and 1.04, respectively, for men and women with 
ADL limitations.    17
Table 6 assumes that annuities provide consumers with a constant real payout stream; the 
results continue to ignore uncertain medical expenses. Compared to previous findings in the 
nominal annuity case, the actuarial pricing results indicate a slight increase in the utility gains 
from purchasing a real annuity. This pattern holds for people in good health, as well as for 
people in poor health with access to actuarially fair annuity premiums. Under uniform pricing, 
however, the opposite results obtain. Both men and women with ADL limitations would be 
worse off if they purchased a real rather than a fixed nominal annuity. This result is due to the 
fact that these persons have a low probability of surviving to the oldest ages. Since a fixed 
nominal annuity offers higher real payouts early on, as compared to a real annuity, the utility 
gains for the less healthy are higher in the first case. These findings suggest that insurers can 
mitigate the effects of adverse selection for people in poor health, and increase the demand for 
private annuities, by providing annuities that offer higher payments in earlier years of the 
contracts.   
Table 6 here   
We now shift attention to the results of our extended model to show how desired 
annuitization and AEW values change when people face both uncertain survival and uncertain 
out-of-pocket medical expenses. Table 7 reports the figures for each state of health and three 
values of pre-existing real annuity: 25, 50, and 75 percent of wealth. We focus on the case of a 
fixed nominal annuity under uniform pricing, and a risk aversion level of three.  
Table 7 here 
Here we see that both optimal annuitization and utility gains from purchasing a nominal 
annuity are lower when people face out-of-pocket medical expenses. In the case of a pre-existing 
real annuity worth 50 percent of wealth, we find that people would forgo less of their wealth to   18
purchase a nominal annuity. When uncertain medical expenses are accounted for, the AEW 
values fall from 1.17 to 1.04 for men with ADL limitations, and from 1.27 to 1.19 for men with 
no functioning problems. Similar results are observed for women. These results suggest that 
AEW is overstated 5 to 11 percent ignoring out-of-pocket medical expenses. Not surprisingly, 
the largest differences are for people with functional limitations, since they have the highest 
probability of remaining in poor health and therefore have the highest risk of incurring out-of-
pocket medical expenses over the life cycle.  
The effect of uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenses is more evident when we 
compare optimal levels of annuitization. Previous studies have indicated that people in poor 
health rarely annuitize (Brown 2001b; Johnson et al. 2004). Indeed, our findings rationalize this 
empirical evidence, since because of precautionary motives, full annuitization is unlikely to be 
an optimal solution. In contrast to earlier studies and our simpler model, we now predict that all 
retirees, regardless of health status, will only partially annuitize at age 65. As expected, those in 
poorest health would be expected to convert the smallest amount of their wealth into an annuity. 
Table 6 shows that among men with ADL limitations, the optimal annuitization of additional 
wealth (conditional on Social Security being half of total wealth) is 19 percent, while among 
women in the same health status, the figure is 27 percent. 
Finally, we also offer some sensitivity analysis for other parameters. Increasing the 
amount invested in Social Security and pension plans to 75 percent of wealth further reduces the 
optimal levels of annuitization and AEW values. Two factors explain this additional reduction. 
First, when more initial wealth is held as a pre-existing real annuity, the insurance value of 
additional annuitization is reduced. Second, as discussed earlier, out-of-pocket medical expenses 
are measured as a proportion of Social Security benefits. Therefore, increasing the value of pre-  19
existing real annuity automatically increases the nominal value of out-of-pocket medical 
expenses, and therefore it produces more precautionary savings in our model. Although this is 
only one way to formulate the problem, it is illustrative in showing that private annuities can 
become worthless for people in poor health who are over-annuitized and face the risk of 
incurring large out-of-pocket medical expenses.  
Discussion 
We have examined how differences in health status can influence the decision to 
purchase a life annuity. Our main contribution has been to show that the insurance value of a life 
annuity may be smaller than that reported in prior studies.  Our findings suggest that differences 
in health and anticipated health care expenses can help explain why many persons do not fully 
annuitize at retirement. While prior research suggested that an average person would forgo about 
40 percent of his wealth to purchase a life annuity (Mitchell et al. 1999), these models indicate 
that this may not hold for the majority of the population, for two reasons. First, for someone with 
health problems, a life annuity priced using annuitant mortality rates implies expected payouts 
well below the actuarially fair value for that retiree. We provide evidence that adverse selection 
in annuities reduces the annuity equivalent wealth from values greater than 1.5, to values close to 
1.17 for people in poor health, and 1.28 for people in good health.   
Previous studies have also ignored precautionary savings motivated by uncertain out-of-
pocket medical expenses. Our stylized life cycle model with uncertain out-of-pocket medical 
expenses shows that annuities become less attractive to people facing such medical expenses. 
Caution is necessary when analyzing our results, since we compare optimal consumption paths 
for average consumers, and there may still be unexplained heterogeneity between people in 
different health states. Also, future research should incorporate correlation between medical   20
expenses and future mortality as well as bequest motives. Finally, it may be useful to put our 
findings in context. Thus, regardless of health status and medical shocks, full annuitization 
would still be optimal, if annuity markets were truly complete and were both life and health 
contingent (Davidoff et al. 2003). Nevertheless, when both adverse selection and uncertain 
medical expenses are accounted for and annuity markets are incomplete, we show that annuity 
equivalent wealth values are fairly low for people in poor health, and about 25% higher for 
people in good health.  
Some implications of our analysis are worth noting. First, earlier investigations have used 
the annuity equivalent wealth measures as explanatory variables in models predicting the 
probability of planning to annuitize (Brown 2001b; Petrova 2003). Although such models control 
for health status (Brown 2001b), our study indicates that they should account directly for health 
differentials in the AEW measures. Second, our findings also suggest that offering higher 
payouts for consumers in case of a medical shock can make annuities more attractive for many, 
and perhaps most, of the elderly. Future research should examine how insurers can fashion 
annuity contracts that better fit the needs of the older, perhaps unhealthy, population. Finally, this 
model predicts that most retirees would be made worse off by requiring full annuitization, if 
uniform pricing were involved. These results are important in the context of Social Security 
reforms proposing personal retirement accounts with mandatory annuitization. Indeed, 
mandatory annuitization should integrate risk classification providing actuarially fair annuities to 
people in different health states.     21
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Table 1     Life Expectancy at Age 65, HRS (1993-2000)
Women Men
No Functioning Problems 21.04 16.78
IADL Limitations 18.89 14.20
ADL Limitations 14.33 11.06
Source: Author's calculations as described in the text. 
 
 
Table 2     Annuity values per premium dollar, fixed immediate real
                 annuity purchased at age 65, before-tax calculations
Health at the age of annuity purchase
Men
3% 0.89 0.76 0.60
5% 0.91 0.79 0.63
7% 0.92 0.81 0.66
Women
3% 0.97 0.88 0.69
5% 0.98 0.90 0.71
7% 0.98 0.91 0.74
Notes: Each entry shows the expected present discounted value of the annuity 
payouts per dollar of annuity premium. All calculations assume premium costs 
are calculated based on the Annuitant Mortality Life Table (SOA 1999). 
Assuming no loads as per Mitchell et al. (1999).
IADL        
Limitations
ADL   
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Table 3     Distribution of Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses













Median           
Value
Categories        
(% of Social 
Secuirty Income)
Frequency        
(%)
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Table 4      Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results of the Probability of Incurring Out-of-Pocket 
                  Medical Expenses Between 1998 and 2000, Ages 65 and Older
Log (L2/L1) Log (L4/L1) Log (L6/L1) Log (L8/L1) Log (L10/L1)
Constant -2.024 ** -4.414 ** -4.556 ** -8.656 ** -10.938 **
(0.335)          (0.730)          (1.279)          (1.905)          (1.079)         
Age 0.005 0.002 -0.016 0.046 0.073 *
(0.004)          (0.010)          (0.017)          (0.025)          (0.013)         
Sex (Female) 0.272 ** 0.644 ** 0.835 ** -0.030 0.455 **
(0.061)          (0.145)        (0.256)        (0.372)        (0.229)        
Health Status 
a
      IADL Limitations 0.251 ** 0.391 * 0.441 -0.015 0.932 **
(0.065)          (0.154)          (0.256)          (0.461)          (0.288)         
      ADL Limitations 0.239 ** 0.935 ** 0.845 ** 1.010 * 1.736 **
(0.089)          (0.174)          (0.301)          (0.446)          (0.291)         
Log-Likelihhod Function = -13,110
Sample Size=9,038
Source: HRS (1998, 2000)
Notes:  Categories of Medical Expenses (% of Social Security Income): L1=  0-25 percent; L2= 25-50 percent; L4= 75-100 percent; 
 L6= 125-150 percent; L8= 175-200 percent; L10= 300+ percent. Standard errors in parantheses. * p < .05; ** p < .01  
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Table 5    Annuity Equivalent Value and Optimal Annuitization, Model 1, Fixed Nominal Annuity 
                  (Inflation =3.2%)
Women
    No Functioning Problems
            Actuarially Fair Premium 1.172 50 1.244 50 1.245 50
            Uniform Pricing 1.152 50 1.222 50 1.224 50
    IADL Limitations
            Actuarially Fair Premium 1.241 50 1.340 50 1.359 50
            Uniform Pricing 1.122 50 1.220 50 1.229 50
    ADL Limitations
            Actuarially Fair Premium 1.435 50 1.629 50 1.675 50
            Uniform Pricing 1.043 39 1.170 50 1.230 50
Men
       No Functioning Problems
               Actuarially Fair Premium 1.261 50 1.395 50 1.437 50
               Uniform Pricing 1.156 50 1.277 50 1.366 50
       IADL Limitations
               Actuarially Fair Premium 1.379 50 1.570 50 1.639 50
               Uniform Pricing 1.096 46 1.248 50 1.311 50
       ADL Limitations
               Actuarially Fair Premium 1.550 50 1.852 50 1.980 50
               Uniform Pricing 1.022 26 1.167 50 1.263 50
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Table 6     Annuity Equivalent Value and Optimal Annuitization, Model 1, Real Annuity 
Women
    No Functioning Problems
            Actuarially Fair Premium 1.187 50 1.290 50 1.322 50
            Uniform Pricing 1.154 50 1.255 50 1.285 50
    IADL Limitations
            Actuarially Fair Premium 1.255 50 1.387 50 1.439 50
            Uniform Pricing 1.110 44 1.230 50 1.270 50
    ADL Limitations
            Actuarially Fair Premium 1.451 50 1.681 50 1.776 50
            Uniform Pricing 1.030 25 1.151 42 1.220 44
Men
       No Functioning Problems
               Actuarially Fair Premium 1.273 50 1.441 50 1.510 50
               Uniform Pricing 1.139 46 1.280 50 1.359 50
       IADL Limitations
               Actuarially Fair Premium 1.393 50 1.616 50 1.727 50
               Uniform Pricing 1.075 35 1.228 45 1.309 50
       ADL Limitations
               Actuarially Fair Premium 1.563 50 1.903 50 2.073 50
               Uniform Pricing 1.011 16 1.140 38 1.233 43























Pre-Existing Real Annuity Worth 50% of Wealth
CRRA=1 CRRA=3
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Table 7   Annuity Equivalent Value and Optimal Annuitization Under Uniform Pricing, Results for Both Models,
                Fixed Nomimal Annuity
Women
    No Functioning Problems
     Model 1: Uncertain Survival 1.229 75 1.222 50 1.195 25
     Model 2: Uncertain Survival w/ oop Med.Costs 1.221 75 1.160 46 1.066 16
    IADL Limitations
     Model 1: Uncertain Survival 1.229 75 1.220 50 1.220 25
     Model 2: Uncertain Survival w/ oop Med.Costs 1.207 75 1.129 36 1.017 13
    ADL Limitations
     Model 1: Uncertain Survival 1.221 75 1.170 50 1.068 25
     Model 2: Uncertain Survival w/ oop Med.Costs 1.183 67 1.051 27 0.985 -3
Men
    No Functioning Problems
     Model 1: Uncertain Survival 1.332 75 1.277 50 1.193 25
     Model 2: Uncertain Survival w/ oop Med.Costs 1.301 75 1.196 36 1.061 15
    IADL Limitations
     Model 1: Uncertain Survival 1.309 75 1.248 50 1.139 25
     Model 2: Uncertain Survival w/ oop Med.Costs 1.282 69 1.135 31 1.019 12
    ADL Limitations
     Model 1: Uncertain Survival 1.276 75 1.167 50 1.046 18
     Model 2: Uncertain Survival w/ oop Med.Costs 1.230 64 1.042 19 0.987 -3
Note: Model 1: Only Uncertain Survival; Model 2: Both Uncertain Survival and Out-of-Pocket Medical Costs.
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Figure 1   Distribution of Health Status by Age, conditional 
                   on Health Status at age 65, Men
Source: HRS (1993-2000)
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